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The distributional implications of antitrust regulation imply a political cleavage be-
tween consumers and producers. I argue that the relative strength of these two groups
depends on the level of democracy. In particular, an expansion of the franchise and
competitive elections will increase the relative political weight of consumers, result-
ing in policies that favors their interests. An empirical implication of the argument
is that the likelihood of eﬀective competition policy reform increases with democracy.
I test this proposition in two stages using an original dataset measuring competition
agency design in 156 developing countries covering the period 1975-2007. First, I esti-
mate hazard models on the timing of competition policy reform. Second, since “laws
on the books” do not necessarily indicate a commitment to eﬀective policy, I create
an original index measuring governments’ commitments to antitrust policy. The index
captures the independence of the agency, resource (budget and staﬃng) allocations, ex-
pert perceptions, and actual legal actions. The results of the empirical analysis support
the proposition that democracy improves governments’ commitments to competition
policy.
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The canonical models of regulation imply a political conﬂict between consumers and produc-
ers (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976). Consumers favor greater levels of economic competition,
which lowers prices and increases aggregate welfare. Producers prefer lax regulatory policy,
allowing them to maintain or expand their anticompetitive rents. This paper argues that
democratic political institutions mediate the strength of these two groups. In particular, I
suggest that an expansion of the franchise and competitive elections will increase the polit-
ical weight of consumers, resulting in policies that favors their interests. I provide one of
the ﬁrst direct tests of the link between democracy and consumer strength using an original
dataset measuring competition (antitrust) agency design in 156 developing countries cov-
ering the period 1975-2007. The results support the proposition that democracy increases
governments’ commitments to competition policy.
One of the main factors contributing to market competition is government regulation of
anticompetitive behavior. Welfare enhancing competition is characterized by the entry of
new ﬁrms—foreign and domestic—into product markets, which eliminates producer rents,
leading to higher overall welfare, lower prices, and lower unemployment. The delegation of
regulatory authority to an independent competition agency has been shown to increase the
entry rates of new ﬁrms into the market (Kee and Hoekman, 2007) and economic competition
(Voight, 2009). In spite of the beneﬁts of economic competition to developing countries,
many governments still have no formal institutional means of penalizing the anticompetitive
practices of incumbent producers. In my sample of 156 developing countries covering the
period 1975-2007, 74 passed laws delegating competition policy to a regulatory agency; 82
have no formal regulatory oversight. Since delegation of regulatory authority to competition
agencies is ultimately a political decision, I highlight how the political rules of the game
change policymakers’ incentives to pursue competition policy reform.
I oﬀer an explanation for variation in regulatory institutions that builds upon a well-
known social cleavage: increases in economic competition from a non-competitive status quo
1imply a redistribution of wealth from organized incumbent oligopolists (“producers”) to dif-
fuse consumers (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Rogowski and Kayser, 2002). Competition
policy enforcement weakens the ability of incumbents to capture and maintain rents; this
beneﬁts consumers through favorable price and employment eﬀects. The redistribution im-
plies political conﬂict: incumbent interests will lobby to maintain and expand their rents,
and consumers will support greater competition policy enforcement.
I advance a straightforward proposition that to my knowledge has been overlooked. In
particular, I argue that the level of democracy aﬀects the strength of consumers relative to
producers. Indeed, since the median voter is a consumer, an expansion of the franchise and
electoral competition in a democracy will increase the political weight of consumers relative
to producers. The empirical implication is that governments’ commitments to antitrust
policy will increase with the level of democracy.
The empirical contribution of the paper provides one of the ﬁrst direct tests of the polit-
ical determinants of regulation. The use of policy as the dependent variable contrasts with
much of the existing research, which generally relies upon distant economic outcomes as
the dependent variable. For instance, the important contribution by Rogowski and Kayser
(2002) makes inferences about the eﬀect of institutions on consumer strength by measuring
the correlation between electoral institutions and prices. These authors infer that electoral
institutions shape policymakers’ incentives in the production of certain policies that aﬀect
prices, but the intermediate stage in the causal chain (institutions to policies) is not tested.
Similarly, Rosenbluth and Schaap (2003) study the eﬀects of political institutions on interest
rate spreads; and Persson et al. (2003) and Kuniková and Rose-Ackerman (2005) use sub-
jective corruption indices as the dependent variable. My work is closer in spirit to Djankov
et al. (2002), Scartascini (2002), Pagano and Volpin (2005), and Quinn (1997, 2003), who
also employ policy outputs as the dependent variable.
Using an original dataset on competition policy in 156 developing countries over the
period 1975-2007, I test the theory in two stages. The ﬁrst is to measure the eﬀect of
2democracy on the timing of laws delegating regulatory authority to competition agencies.
Since laws alone do not necessarily reﬂect support for a particular policy, the second step
develops an original index measuring governments’ commitments to competition policy, and
estimates its political determinants. The results of the empirical tests are consistent with
the proposition that political competition leads to consumer-friendly policies.
My paper also contributes to broader debates in international political economy. First, I
ﬁnd no evidence of a robust relationship between external openness and an eﬀective behind-
the-border competition regime. To the extent that economic integration has not produced
welfare improvements in many developing countries, the absence of correlation between these
policies may suggest that welfare gains only accrue when trade liberalization is combined
with eﬀective competition enforcement. Second, the evidence that competition policies can
reﬂect consumer interests despite the collective action hurdles that these actors face is in line
with recent consumption-based theories of economic policy (Baker, 2005; Trumbull, 2006).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents
my theoretical model. Section 4 describes the research design and the variables. Section 5
reports the results of the models of agency adoption, and the empirical analysis of agency
commitment appears in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The academic study of regulation was revolutionized by the work of Stigler and Peltzman
(S-P). The S-P model advanced research in positive political economy by highlighting the
distributional implications of various regulatory arrangements. By explaining that regulation
results in a transfer between social groups, their work brought politics into the mix. The
important intuition is that politicians do not always pursue policies that maximize social
welfare.
3The S-P model explains the competing political interests that result from the transfer
that regulation represents. An eﬀective antitrust policy is a tax on incumbent monopolists,
and a subsidy to consumers. They argued that regulatory institutions should be thought of as
an equilibrium outcome of a market, the political market for policy. Rogowski and Kayser
(2002) extend the model to argue that majoritarian electoral institutions in democracies
are more conducive to the interests of consumers. Other important contributions highlight
how special interests compete with the public for policies that favor them (Grossman and
Helpman, 1994; Frieden, 1991).
Related research explains how political institutions ﬁlter the interests of the relevant
social groups into policy, and several studies highlight the eﬀects of democratic political
institutions. Milner and Kubota (2005) and Dutt and Mitra (2002) argue that democracy
increases the likelihood of trade liberalization in developing countries. The reason is that,
under a two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin framework, the median voter in a capital scarce/labor
abundant developing country gains from trade liberalization. Related work argues that the
democracy contributes to economic reform by increasing the political weight of the elec-
torate and reducing the clout of special interests (Stokes, 2001; Weyland, 2002).1 Other
contributions explain how various electoral rules within democracies inﬂuence economic pol-
icy outcomes (Cox and McCubbins, 2001; Shugart and Haggard, 2000; Persson and Tabellini,
2004a,b).
This paper also contributes to debates regarding the delegation of regulatory authority
to independent institutions. The literature on central banking argues that anti-inﬂationary
monetary policies are more likely under an independent body that is not subject to electoral
pressure (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogoﬀ, 1985; Lohmann, 1992). Other approaches explain
the delegation of authority to independent regulatory agencies as a process of diﬀusion
(Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2005, 2006; Henisz et al., 2005) or domestic politics (Murillo and
Martinez-Gallardo, 2007).
1See Milner and Mukherjee (2009) of a review of the literature linking democracy to economic liberaliza-
tion.
43 The Eﬀect of Democracy on Competition Policy
I argue that democracy makes policymakers more sensitive to consumer interests, thereby
increasing the likelihood of competition policy reform. The policy preferences of consumers
follow from the S-P theory of regulation, which posits a conﬂict between producers and
consumers based on the distributional implications of regulation. Consider an incumbent
ﬁrm with market power, or the ability to charge a price that exceeds marginal cost without
inducing new ﬁrms to enter the market. Market power exists when barriers to potential com-
petitors enable incumbent ﬁrms to restrict output and raise prices,2 which implies a transfer
of wealth from consumers to producers in the form of a monopoly rent. The distributional
implications of market power result in a cleavage between incumbent ﬁrms and consumers.
On one hand, incumbents beneﬁt from market power in the form of economic rents, and
they therefore have an incentive to oppose antitrust or competition policy oversight.3 One
the other hand, a reduction of market power—greater product market competition—favors
consumers through favorable prices eﬀects. Consumers will support delegation of antitrust
authority to competition agencies that promote well-functioning markets and penalize anti-
competitive behavior.
Political institutions go unaddressed under the S-P setup, but the eﬀects of democracy
can be deduced as follows. Consider the process of democratization as an expansion of
the selectorate, or the portion of the population that participates in choosing the political
leadership (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Following Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003),
2An important point of emphasis is that producers need not be monopolists in the strict sense in order
to have market power: barriers to competition may bestow market power on more than one ﬁrm, enabling
each to set price above marginal cost.
3I assume that incumbent ﬁrms’ opposition will exist in spite of the fact that antitrust agencies have not
necessarily pursued policies that improve consumer welfare (Long et al., 1973; Siegried, 1975; Asch, 1975);
one reason is that regulatory agencies may be captured by incumbent ﬁrms, who use them perversely to
deter competition (Shughart, 1990; McChesney and Shughart, 1995). Other empirical work suggests that
the agencies regulate according to partisan political interests of the chief executive. There is reason to
believe, therefore, that the formal independence of regulatory bodies is a crucial factor in the extent to which
they are opposed by incumbent interests. If the government can make a credible commitment to delegate
independent regulatory authority to the competition agency, then entrenched businesses are more likely to
oppose its existence. This is why a portion of my contribution is to create an index measuring agency
independence.
5deﬁne the winning coalition as the subset of the selectorate whose support is required for the
leadership to maintain political power. If we think of democratization as an expansion of the
franchise, it follows that democratization increases the size of the selectorate and changes
the makeup of the winning coalition. Democratization induces policymakers to pursue the
electoral support of new groups of voters.
An important distinction between autocracy and democracy is the makeup of the winning
coalition. In autocratic settings, leaders maintain power through the support of a coalition
that could include any number of groups, but by deﬁnition, the minimum winning coalition in
autocracies does not include a majority of citizens. Most often, the minimum winning coali-
tion in autocracies includes economic elites,“the major producers/investors in the economy”
(Acemoglu, 2008, p.1). In many developing countries, the autocratic selectorate consists of a
coalition of industrialists and their labor allies who gained economic power through various
development strategies that shielded them from domestic, or more commonly in the Latin
American case, external competitors (Weyland, 2002). Other conﬁgurations of autocratic
support include the military or religious groups (Geddes, 1999; Gandhi and Przeworski,
2007).
Democratization changes the makeup of the minimum winning coalition by expanding
the selectorate. Quite simply, an expansion of the franchise results is an increase in the
proportion of the minimum winning coalition represented by consumers, and a reduction in
the proportion of the winning coalition represented by producers, or the economic elite.
Electoral competition in democracy translates the interests of the winning coalition into
policies that favor the median voter. The reason is that, as democracy strengthens, politi-
cal leaders have incentives to appeal to new coalitions of voters who have been previously
ignored. Indeed, under standard assumptions, it is easy to show that the platforms of the
two candidates in a competitive election will converge on the preferences of a median voter
(Downs, 1957; Grossman and Helpman, 1994), or those of the dominant majority (McGuire
6and Olson, 1996; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994).4 If we assume that consumers make up a larger
group than do incumbent producers, an expansion of the franchise to some approximation
of universal suﬀrage ensures that the median voter is a consumer. Thus, political competi-
tion will lead to policies that improve economic competition, and increase aggregate welfare.
Furthermore, as political competition increases, opposing parties will draw attention to the
inﬂuence of bribes on policy outcomes that are unfavorable to the median voter. As voters
become aware of the inﬂuence of anticompetitive interest groups on competition policy, the
incentives for regulatory laxity will decline.5
In sum, I have argued that the relative political weight of consumers increases with
democracy. The empirical implication of this proposition is twofold. First, the likelihood of
competition policy reform will increase with democracy. Second, the government’s commit-
ment to competition policy will improve with democracy.
4 Research Design and Variables
This section presents the identiﬁcation strategy and the main variables used to test the
hypothesis developed in the previous section. I constructed a new dataset on competition
(antitrust) agency design and independence in 156 developing countries.6 My dataset is
unique in its coverage of competition laws passed during the period 1975-2007. The primary
sources are the World Bank Competition Policy database,7 and various issues of the annual
4The deadweight loss from uncompetitive markets accrues to consumers, who constitute the dominant
majority in a democracy.
5Note that this argument provides less analytical traction for explaining variation in regulatory outcomes
within democracies, where the characteristics of interest groups, such as their ability to organize, may aﬀect
the nature of the commitment to regulatory institutions such as competition policy. Stigler argued that
regulation will favor producers because they are a smaller group, implying the per capita beneﬁts will be
greater than for the diﬀuse – and larger – group of consumers. Thus, producers are better able to organize
and lobby for preferred policies. Peltzman’s model allows for a more realistic set of outcomes to emerge;
namely, producers do not always prevail. The eﬀects of interest groups on competition within democracy is
the subject of future research.
6Due to limitations in the data coverage of the explanatory variables, the models include up to 131
countries.
7The database can be found at http://web.worldbank.org.
7Handbook of Competition Enforcement Agencies (Campbell, 2006, 2007, 2008). Supplemen-
tary sources include individual country’s competition agency websites.
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, to measure the eﬀects of democracy on the
timing of competition reform, I record the year of passage of laws delegating authority to
competition agencies. Since I am interested in identifying the aﬀect of democracy on the
speed with which governments delegate regulatory authority to a competition agency, I
estimate a series of proportional hazards models:
hj(t|xj) = h0(t)exp(xjβx) (1)
Hazard models are used to estimate the hazard rate hj(t), or the probability that a gov-
ernment in a particular country j passes legislation delegating regulatory authority to a
competition agency in year t, given that it had not done so in the previous year. The models
are proportional since the hazard that faces country j is proportional to the baseline hazard
h0(t). The exponential function is chosen to avoid negative hazard functions hj(t). A nice
feature of hazard models is that they do not exclude countries that do not pass competition
legislation by the end of the period. Countries are observed from the beginning of the sample
period (the year 1975) up until when they pass legislation, or the end of the period of study
(2007)—whichever comes ﬁrst.
Second, since laws on the books do not necessarily reﬂect the government’s commitment
to a robust competition policy, I also create an original index measuring the governments’
commitments to antitrust enforcement. The index has two independent components: one
gauges de jure commitment to eﬀective policy by coding several indicators of agency inde-
pendence; the second measures de facto commitment by incorporating resource allocations,
expert assessments, and actual regulatory decisions. I provide full details on the construction
of the index in section 6. I model the correlates of competition policy eﬀectiveness using a
Tobit model.
84.1 Independent Variables
To test the eﬀects of democracy and political competition, I incorporate the following vari-
ables. The level of democracy is measured using the familiar Freedom House Political Rights
and Polity scores. I also include two measures of political competition. One, Political Com-
petition (or Polcomp) is the sub-component of Polity that measures political competition.
Two, the variable Parties in the Legislature, from Gandhi (2008), captures de facto political
competition by looking at party representation in the legislature (0=no parties; 1=one politi-
cal holds all the seats; 2=two or more parties hold seats within the legislature). I also include
the Polcon index developed by Henisz (2000), which measures the empirically correlated yet
theoretically distinct concept of veto points, or the number of institutional constraints on
the policymaking discretion of the executive (North and Weingast, 1989; Tsebelis, 2002; Cox
and McCubbins, 2001).
I control for several factors that may aﬀect political competition as well as the state’s in-
stitutional capacity. GDP/capita proxies for institutional development. Population measures
the size of the domestic market.8 Imports and exports as a percentage GDP (Trade/GDP)
captures the eﬀects of external competitive pressures on competition policy reform. The
eﬀect of trade on competition policy is ambiguous: openness to competition from interna-
tional sources may substitute for domestic competition; or governments’ commitments to
international competition may coincide with a commitment to behind the border competi-
tion.9 Finally, some of my models include regional dummy variables to capture the diﬀusion
of political and policy reform that has been shown to occur systematically within regional
clusters (Henisz et al., 2005; Levi-Faur, 2005).
Table 1 reports overall summary statistics. Table 2 reports correlation coeﬃcients. Coun-
try averages appear in Table 10.
8The variables GDP/capita and Population are logged.
9The economic control variables are from the World Development Indicators.
95 Models of Competition Policy Reform
This section reports the results of an estimation of the eﬀects of democracy on the timing
of delegation to competition agencies. Assuming data availability, the sample period covers
1975-2007. Countries drop out of the model upon the year of delegation. The analysis
includes up to 131 developing countries, of which up to 62 passed competition laws during
the period of study. I begin by looking at the unconditional Kaplan-Meier estimates of the
hazard rate, reported in Figure 1. The hazard rate is increasing over time, which suggests
that I chose a parameterization of h0(t) that allows it to grow.
Thus, my preferred speciﬁcation is the Weibull model, which parameterizes h0(t) as:
h0(t) = αt
α−1 exp(β0) (2)
This implies that the proportional hazard model is speciﬁed as:
hj(t|xj) = αt
α−1 exp(β0 + xjβx) (3)
This model allows for monotonic changes in the the underlying hazard over time; these
changes are determined by the evolutionary parameter α. For example, when α = 1, the
hazard is constant; for values of α > 1, the hazard is increasing; for α < 1, the hazard is
decreasing.
The Weibull model has the advantage of providing theoretically useful information about
the eﬀects of diﬀusion (or contagion) on a country’s propensity to reform the competition
regime through the evolutionary parameter α. Positive and signiﬁcant values of α can be
interpreted as evidence of external inﬂuence or policy diﬀusion. The evolutionary parameter
thus provides an empirical substitute for time trends or variables that capture the percentage
of countries in the region that have passed reforms in a given year.
10I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model (CPH) as a robustness test.10 Unlike the
Weibull speciﬁcation, The CPH model makes no a priori assumptions about the distribution
of the hazard function. The CPH model is speciﬁed as follows:
hj(t|xj) = h0(t)exp(xjβx) (4)
In this model, the baseline hazard is left unspeciﬁed, and as such the model makes no
assumptions about the shape of the hazard over time. The only assumption is that the
general shape of the hazard is invariant across countries.
The estimations produced using the Weibull and the CPH models are directly compara-
ble. That is, both models produce estimations of βx, which have a standard interpretation:
exp(βi) is the hazard ratio for the ith coeﬃcient, or the proportional increase in the haz-
ard rate corresponding to a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable xi. The Weibull
speciﬁcation produces an additional estimate of the evolutionary parameter α.
Table 3 reports the regression results of a set of Weibull proportional hazard models
measuring the eﬀect of democracy on the passage of law establishing a competition agency.
I include several alternative proxies for democracy. I begin in column 1 by introducing
the Freedom House Political Rights Index. The estimated coeﬃcient, which is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% level, can be interpreted as follows: a one standard
deviation (1.98) increase in FH Political Rights increases the hazard rate for delegation by
exp(.19 × 1.98) = 1.46 points (around 46%). This implies that more democratic countries
are more likely to adopt competition policy reforms sooner.
Models 2-3 test the robustness of this result by introducing other well-known measures of
democracy. Model 2 includes Polity, and the results suggest that more democratic countries
pass competition law earlier: a one point increase in the Polity score increases the hazard
by around exp(.06), or 6%; a one standard deviation increase in the Polity score (6.85)
10As with the Weibull speciﬁcation, I estimate robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the
country level. Under the CPH speciﬁcation, the Efron method is used to handle ties, in which two or more
countries adopt during the same year.
11increases the hazard by nearly 51%. Column 3 includes the variable Freedom House/Polity,
which represents the average of the Freedom House and Polity scores, taken from the Quality
of Government dataset (Teorell et al., 2009).11 The estimates reported in column 3 indicate
that a one standard deviation increase in Freedom House/Polity increases the hazard by
approximately 50%.
To illustrate the result, I divide the sample according the Freedom House/ Polity democ-
racy index. I deﬁne democracies as country-years above the median score, and autocracies
as scores below the median. Figure 2 illustrates the survival functions of these two groups.
By the end of the period, the cumulative probability that a democracy passes competition
policy reform is over twice the cumulative probability of reform in a non-democracy.
I introduce alternative indicators of democracy and political competition in models 4-
6. Column 4 includes the political competition concept (Polcomp), a component of the
more general Polity index. A one-standard deviation increase in this index results in a
52% increase in the hazard rate. Model 5 includes an indicator, developed by Gandhi
(2008), measuring of the number of political parties represented in the legislature. Figure 3
graphs the survival functions corresponding to the results in column 5. The graph illustrates
that the cumulative probability of reform is much lower where only one party controls the
legislature; countries without parties are extremely unlikely to reform. Model 6 introduces an
alternative conceptualization of democratic veto points (Political Constraints). Interestingly,
veto players do not signiﬁcantly increase the probability of competition policy reform. This
suggests that the mechanism driving reform in democracies has more to do with political
competition and the expansion of the franchise to include consumers, rather than constraints
on executive policymaking discretion. Finally, model 7 demonstrates the eﬀect of democracy
remains robust to the inclusion of regional dummy variables.
11This variable ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. It is generated by
transforming the average values of the Freedom House measures of democracy and the Polity score along
a scale 0-10. These transformed values are then averaged. Since the coverage of Freedom House is more
extensive than that of Polity, the index relies on imputed values of Polity for the approximately 8 countries
where Polity is missing. The imputation is the result of regressing Polity on the average Freedom House
measure.
12Other diﬀerences across countries appear to aﬀect the probability of competition policy
reform. In particular, wealthier countries are more likely to reform sooner. I ﬁnd the prob-
ability of early reform increases with the size of the population. I also ﬁnd some evidence
suggesting that external donors push countries to adopt competition enforcement agencies:
the amount of foreign aid that the country receives appears to contribute to regulatory re-
form, though the estimated coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. Trade openness,
on the other hand, does not appear to matter. The estimated coeﬃcients are generally
positive, but never statistically signiﬁcant. This result conforms with the argument that
the interests and incentives concerning external (e.g., trade) and behind-the-border (e.g.,
competition policy) reforms are fundamentally distinct.
Along with the eﬀects of democracy, there is strong evidence of policy diﬀusion. Indeed,
as reported in Table 3, the evolutionary parameter enters each model positive, with a value
above 2, and in each case is statistically signiﬁcant at the 99% level. This result suggests
that the hazard function for passing competition policy reform increases during the sample
period. To demonstrate this eﬀect, consider the baseline hazard rates in the years 1985
(t=10) and 2005 (t=30) based on the estimate of α from model 1 (α = 2.23):
h0(2005)/h0(1985) = (30/10)
α−1 = (30/10)
2.23−1 = 3.86 (5)
This means that a country is over 3 times more likely to pass competition policy reform in
2005 than in 1985, and provides evidence of policy contagion over time. The mechanisms
driving this phenomenon deserves attention and is left for future research.
Table 4 probes the robustness of the main ﬁndings, and indeed the results are very similar
when I estimate a Cox model of the hazard rate. In line with my theory, competition policy
reforms occur sooner in democracies. The results also conﬁrm that richer countries and those
with larger populations are more likely to pass competition policy laws.
136 Determinants of Competition Agency Commitment
Since the passage of laws does not necessarily reﬂect a government’s commitment to eﬀec-
tive competition policy, in this section I develop an original index of commitment, which I
model as a function of the identical set of independent variables used to explain the decision
to delegate. The motivation behind the construction of the index is to provide an easily
replicable proxy for antitrust policy commitment that can be extended to a large sample
of countries. The variable Agency Commitment measures features of the statute, as well as
how the law is actually applied. Speciﬁcally, Agency Commitment represents the average
of the standardized values of two sub-indexes: De Jure Independence captures institutional
features relating to the legal independence of the regulatory body based on the law; De Facto
Commitment measures resource allocations, expert assessments, and actual regulatory deci-
sions. I detail the construction of each sub-index in turn. Table 5 provides a summary of the
index components, and Table 10 reports the Agency Commitment scores for each country in
the sample.
6.0.1 De Jure Independence
The construction of the sub-index of competition agency independence follows previous work
on central bank independence (CBI) by Cukierman et al. (1992) and others. The sub-index
De Jure Independence has four components. The ﬁrst component concerns the relationship
between the government and the head of the competition agency. In particular, I measure
the rules governing the tenure of the agency head. Following the CBI literature, I assume
that a ﬁxed term in which the agency head cannot be removed to be indicative of greater
political independence. I code a dummy variable equal to 1 if the term of the agency head is
ﬁxed. I also assume that independence increases with length of the term, and so I code an
indicator variable equal to one if the term exceeds 5 years. I sum these dummy variables to
create a measure of the independence of the agency head, ranging from 0 to 2 (0 = no ﬁxed
term; 1 = ﬁxed term < 5 years; 2 = ﬁxed term > 5 years).
14The second component of De Jure Independence concerns the stated independence of the
agency. I generate a dummy variable equal to 1 if the language of the law establishing the
competition agency stipulates agency “independence.” The third indicator variable is coded
equal to one if the competition agency represents a unique entity, meaning that it does not
fall under the authority of another government agency (regardless of whether the overarching
entity is itself independent). Finally, I code a dummy variable equal to one if the agency has
been in existence for over ten years as of 2007. The four components are averaged to create
De Jure Independence.12 Countries without competition agencies receive scores of zero.
6.0.2 De Facto Commitment
The sub-index De Facto Commitment attempts to operationalize the government’s actual
commitment to agency eﬀectiveness. The variable incorporates four main components: bud-
get commitments, staﬃng commitments, expert assessments, and actual regulatory actions.
To capture the government’s resource commitment to the competition agency, I gathered
data on agency staﬃng and budgets over the period 2002-2007. Using these data, I ran a
regression of the (logged) number of employees as a function of the (logged) population for
each year for which data were available, and computed the average residuals for each country.
The motivation for this approach is to capture the distinction between what a government
actually allocates toward competition policy and the mean allocation based on the size of
the country. Similarly, I ran regressions of the (logged) the agency budget as a function of
(logged) GDP and computed the average residuals over the period.
The third component of the index captures expert opinions using data from the World
Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Report. The report provides the aver-
age response among practitioners, business persons, and academics to a variety of questions
regarding the economic and institutional environment for 125 countries. My index incorpo-
12To ensure that data limitations are not skewing the results, I only include in my sample countries for
which data on at least two of the subcomponents of De Jure Independence are not available. As a result,
approximately 11 countries with competition agencies drop out of the sample.
15rates the country average for the following question regarding the eﬀectiveness of antitrust
policy: “Anti-monopoly policy in your country is: (1 = lax and not eﬀective at promoting
competition, 7 = eﬀective and promotes competition).”
The fourth component of De Facto Commitment measures actual antitrust actions by the
competition agency. I code a dummy variable equal to one if the agency has ever intervened
over a proposed merger, regardless of the outcome of the legal action.
The variable De Facto Commitment is the average of the standardized values of: the aver-
age residuals of the staﬃng and budget regressions, the WEF score, and the dummy variable
for antitrust regulatory action.13 Countries without competition agencies are assigned the
minimum value.
6.1 Political Competition and Agency Commitment
In this section, I estimate the correlates of my index of competition agency commitment.
The index Agency Commitment represents the average of the standardized values of the De
Jure Independence and De Facto Commitment subindexes. I am interested in estimating the
following relationship:
Yi = β0 + β1Xi + β2Ii + ϵi (6)
where Yi represents Agency Commitment in country i; Ii are the various democracy variables;
and Xi is a vector of economic controls. All of the independent variables are averaged over
the period of study (1975-2007). A one-boundary Tobit model is used due to the censoring at
the minimum value of the dependent variable (i.e., countries without competition agencies).
Table 6 reports the results of models testing the relationship between democracy and
competition agency commitment. Model 1 includes the Freedom House Political Rights score,
and the results are consistent with the proposition that more democratic governments are
more strongly committed to competition policy. I successively introduce various alternative
13To ensure that data limitations are not skewing the results, I only include in my sample countries for
which data on at least two of the four subcomponents of De Facto Commitment are not available. As a
result, approximately 19 countries with competition agencies are coded as missing.
16indicators of political competition in columns 2-6; the results are consistently supportive of
the hypothesis that democratic political competition is positively associated with competition
policy eﬀectiveness, and the results are substantively signiﬁcant. Table 7 reports the marginal
eﬀects based on model 3, with the control variables x set at their mean values. Columns
7-12 replicate the estimations while including regional dummy variables. The correlation
between democracy and competition policy commitment retains statistical signiﬁcance to
the inclusion of regional indicators.
Several of the control variables are also strongly signiﬁcant. Consistent with the hazard
models, the commitment to competition policy increases with country wealth and population.
External factors also appear to correlate strongly with a commitment to competition policy
eﬀectiveness. In particular, Aid per Capita and Trade enter with positive and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients. These results are consistent with the view that international actors are salient
constituents in favor of a robust competition policy; while they do not support the view that
trade openness substitutes for competition policy.
7 Conclusion
This paper introduced democracy into the debate over the determinants of regulation. I
provided an overlooked extension to the classical positive theory of regulation, arguing that
democracy will lead to regulatory policies that favor consumers. An empirical implication
of the argument is that competition policy will improve with the level of democracy.
The empirical contribution oﬀers one of the ﬁrst direct tests of the political economy
determinants of regulatory reform in developing countries. Using an original dataset covering
156 developing countries over the period 1975-2007, I tested the determinants of regulatory
policy in two stages. First, I estimated duration models on the timing of competition policy
reform. Second, since laws on the books do not necessarily reﬂect eﬀective policy, I created
of an original index of competition policy commitment. The results of both tests are strongly
17supportive of the argument linking democratic political competition to policies that promote
economic competition.
The results shed new light on the politics of globalization and suggest avenues for future
research. In particular, the theory and statistical evidence presented here are consistent with
a nascent body of research that focuses on the inﬂuence of consumers in shaping economic
policy (Baker, 2005; Trumbull, 2006). This work suggests that political economists can gain
analytical traction by extending the standard paradigm in international political economy,
which focuses almost exclusively on conﬂicts between supply-side coalitions that compete
for inﬂuence according to factor- or industry-based cleavages. We will gain new insights
into the origins of economic and regulatory policies through the development of models
that incorporate consumer interests and illustrate the ways in which political institutions
determine the inﬂuence of these demand-side actors.
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Figure 3: Eﬀect of Party Competition on Competition Policy Reform
Table 1: Summary Statistics
variable N mean sd min max
Agency Commitment 2535 -0.352 0.697 -0.712 2.150
De Jure Independence 2663 -0.315 0.813 -0.736 2.190
De Facto Commitment 2535 -0.341 0.722 -0.689 2.455
GDP per capita 2820 6.931 1.366 4.395 10.749
Population 2820 15.315 1.760 11.014 20.994
Aid per capita 2820 3.133 1.503 -6.103 7.645
Trade 2820 0.804 0.466 0.063 3.973
FH Political Rights 2622 3.540 1.978 1 7
Polity 2466 -1.398 6.849 -10 10
Political Competition 2370 4.373 3.388 1 10
Freedom House/Polity 2622 4.464 3.104 0 10
Parties in Legislature 2478 1.323 0.832 0 2










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 3: Hazard Models of Competition Policy Reform (Weibull)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP per capita 0.487*** 0.541*** 0.493*** 0.511*** 0.523*** 0.496*** 0.769***
(0.134) (0.124) (0.133) (0.128) (0.154) (0.133) (0.158)
Population 0.520*** 0.369*** 0.511*** 0.370*** 0.294*** 0.435*** 0.743***
(0.103) (0.112) (0.101) (0.112) (0.112) (0.108) (0.130)
Aid per capita 0.252** 0.172 0.242** 0.155 0.061 0.236** 0.378***
(0.110) (0.109) (0.111) (0.109) (0.129) (0.117) (0.118)
Trade 0.378 0.145 0.352 0.165 -0.096 0.277 0.419
(0.311) (0.331) (0.316) (0.356) (0.331) (0.311) (0.431)












Regional dummies No No No No No No Yes
Observations 2622 2466 2622 2370 2478 2517 2622
Countries 129 121 129 120 131 128 129
Countries reforming 62 61 62 61 54 60 62
Chi-squared 35.455 37.308 38.296 33.708 32.843 30.278 206.474
Evolutionary parameter α 2.229 2.242 2.155 2.214 2.542 2.461 2.183
Note: The table presents the results of the hazard models of the timing of competition policy reform. Variable
deﬁnitions and sources are provided in the text. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
26Table 4: Hazard Models of Competition Policy Reform (Cox Proportional Hazards)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP per capita 0.494*** 0.551*** 0.504*** 0.509*** 0.504*** 0.487*** 0.803***
(0.144) (0.135) (0.143) (0.139) (0.164) (0.142) (0.167)
Population 0.541*** 0.383*** 0.533*** 0.378*** 0.282*** 0.424*** 0.806***
(0.109) (0.113) (0.107) (0.113) (0.110) (0.109) (0.139)
Aid per capita 0.245* 0.169 0.241* 0.143 0.023 0.199 0.428***
(0.125) (0.117) (0.124) (0.114) (0.128) (0.124) (0.131)
Trade 0.440 0.196 0.406 0.211 -0.034 0.326 0.534
(0.308) (0.335) (0.315) (0.359) (0.345) (0.331) (0.409)












Regional dummies No No No No No No Yes
Observations 2622 2466 2622 2370 2478 2517 2622
Countries 129 121 129 120 131 128 129
Countries reforming 62 61 62 61 54 60 62
Chi-squared 33.499 34.281 35.639 31.434 33.487 27.976 187.175
Note: The table presents the results of the hazard models of the timing of competition policy reform. Variable









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 7: Marginal Eﬀects of Independent Variables (based on results from Table 6, Model
3)
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z mean
GDP per capita 0.212 0.057 3.700 0.000 0.100 0.324 7.174
Population 0.287 0.045 6.410 0.000 0.199 0.375 15.515
Aid per capita 0.167 0.059 2.850 0.004 0.052 0.281 3.006
Trade 0.198 0.118 1.680 0.094 -0.034 0.429 0.829
Freedom House/Polity 0.085 0.022 3.910 0.000 0.042 0.127 4.934
95% C.I.
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